Firms hold cash for several reasons, e.g., to seize strategic opportunities as they arise or as a buffer against unexpected shocks. While research has focused on the question as to how much cash a firm should hold, it has mostly ignored how quickly firms move back to their optimal or target cash holdings level once they have been pushed away from that level. Read more here.
Philosophy of the Book Existing textbooks on corporate governance tend to have a strong focus on UK and/or US corporate governance. This focus is somewhat surprising as the UK and US corporate governance systems have features which clearly set them apart from pretty much the rest of the world. Indeed, the typical British and American stock-market listed firm is widely held (held by many shareholders) and control therefore lies with the management rather than the shareholders. In contrast, most stock-exchange listed firms from the rest of the world have a large shareholder whose control is substantial enough to have a significant influence over the firm’s affairs. Given these marked differences in ownership and control, corporate governance issues emerging in non-UK and non-US firms tend to be very different from those that may affect British and American companies. Hence, it is important for a textbook to bear in mind the diversity of ownership and control a