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This module is intended for advanced undergraduates in business and management, accounting, finance, or economics, and Master students. The module is delivered over a total of 24 hours of lectures with a flexible format including traditional lectures, class discussions of the end-of-chapter questions in Goergen (2018) and the multiple choice questions (see below). 


This module aims to introduce you to recent developments in the theory and practice of corporate governance. The module adopts an international perspective by comparing the main corporate governance systems across the world. 


On completion of the module you should be able to: Evaluate the current state of corporate governance in an international context; describe differences in corporate control and managerial power across the world; assess the potential conflicts of interests that may arise in various corporate governance environments; critically evaluate the effectiveness of the main corporate governance mechanisms and their impact on firm value; explain the potential consequences of weak corporate governance as well as behavioural biases on corporate decision making and firm value; analyse the development of corporate social responsibility. 


  1. Defining corporate governance and key theoretical models
  2. Corporate control across the world – Control versus ownership rights
  3. Taxonomies of corporate governance systems
  4. Boards of directors
  5. The disciplining of badly performing managers under different systems of corporate governance 
  6. Corporate governance regulation in an international context
  7. Corporate governance in emerging markets
  8. Behavioural biases and corporate governance
  9. Corporate social responsibility and socially responsible investment 


Goergen, M. (2018), Corporate Governance. A Global Perspective. Andover: Cengage EMA, ISBN 978-1-473-75917-6.

Defining corporate governance and key theoretical models

Goergen (2018), chapter 1.

Corporate control across the world Control versus ownership rights

Goergen (2018), chapters 2-3.

Taxonomies of corporate governance systems

Goergen (2018), chapter 4.

Boards of directors

Goergen (2018), chapter 7.

Incentivising managers and disciplining badly performing managers

Goergen (2018), chapter 8.

Corporate governance regulation in an international context

Goergen (2018), chapter 6.
Further resources
An extensive library covering most national and international codes of corporate governance can be found on the website of the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI): 

Corporate governance in emerging markets

Goergen (2018), chapter 9.

Behavioural biases and corporate governance

Goergen (2018), chapter 12.

Corporate social responsibility and socially responsible investment

Goergen (2018), chapter 13.


PowerPoint Slides
100 multiple choice questions
End-of-chapter discussion questions and exercises – Instructor’s manual 
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Andrei Shleifer’s dataset website with investor protection and anti-director rights indices
Social Sciences Research Network


The above module outline is just one of the many paths through Goergen (2018). There are others, some of which are depicted in the diagram below.


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